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Wiretapping the Mind: A Call to
Regulate Truth Verification in
Employment
SUSAN GARDNER*
Advances in modern investigative techniques are challenging our
traditional notions of individual privacy. This article examines
private industry's use of polygraph tests on current and prospec-
tive employees and discusses the competing interests of an em-
ployee's right to privacy and management's right to be secure
from employee deception.
INTRODUCTION
If the right to privacy means anything at all in our society, it means that
people are entitled to have thoughts, hopes, desires, and dreams that are
beyond the grasping reach of a bureaucrat, an employer, or an electronic
technician.1
"We're not dealing with people's lives. We don't make any judg-
ments."2 So commented an owner of a pilferage control service dur-
ing a recent interview. Using a truth verification device known as a
* Associate Professor, School of Business, California State University, Chico, Cali-
fornia; A.B., 1968, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1977, University of the Pa-
cific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information, of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 784 (1974) (statement of Sena-
tor Sam Ervin) [hereinafter cited as Polygraph Hearings].
2. Evans, Controlling Employee Theft Possible with Lie Detectors, Chico Enter-
prise-Record, June 18, 1983, at 10A, col. 1.
3. The term "truth verification" refers to those technologies, present and future,
which theoretically are capable of or are used to uncover deception. Traditional truth
verification technologies are the polygraph, A. LEMOND & R. FRY, No PLACE TO HIDE
123-33 (1975), and sodium pentathol or truth serum. Depres, Legal Aspects of Drug-
Induced Statements, 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1947). Other devices include the Psycho-
March 1984 Vol. 21 No. 2
galvanic skin response lie detector, the owner offers business organi-
zations programs in internal security, including testing of workers
prior to employment or promotion.4 Confronted with employee thefts
estimated at billions of dollars annually, 5 employers increasingly
view truth verification devices as a panacea to insider crime. In
1982, more than one million applicants and employees were sub-
jected to lie detector testing as a condition of employment.' An esti-
mated 30% of the Fortune 500 companies regularly administer poly-
graph examinations to their employees. 7 Industry proponents argue
that management has an overriding interest in employing workers
who do not and will not steal. They point to the increased reliability
of truth verification devices and resultant reductions in theft from
their usage as justification for these examinations.8
Opponents, however, decry the widespread use of lie detection de-
logic Stress Evaluator (PSE) which records an examinee's voice, Comment, The Psycho-
logical Stress Evaluator: A Recent Development in Lie Detection Technology, 7 U.C.D.
L. REV,. 332, 333 (1974); a lie detection seat which registers movement without the ex-
aminee's knowledge during the examination ("wiggle seat"), Craver, The Inquisitorial
Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30 (1977); hidden cameras to
photograph and measure pupil dilation (retinoscope), id.; and the Silent Answer Test
which requires no verbal answers, Horvath & Reid, The Polygraph Silent Answer Test,
63 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 285 (1972). Future technologies may in-
clude "machines capable of reading thought through the interpretation of cerebral im-
pulses" and "sensing devices implanted in the human body." Craver, supra, at 30.
4. Truth verification devices are used in any or all of the following employment
contexts: pre-employment screening of prospective employees; examination of employees
in connection with particular incidences of wrong-doing; and, routine re-examination of
current employees to act as a deterrent to wrong-doing. See Craver, supra note 3, at 30;
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 148-49 (1967).
5. See CBS Evening News, June 10, 1983, comments by James Stewart, National
Institute of Justice. One-third of employees admit to stealing from their employer. Of
those, 30% admit to over-using or misusing discount privileges and 20% admit stealing
from manufacturing employers. Between $5 and $10 billion annually are lost by em-
ployee theft. MACNEIL-LEHRER REPORT, Corporate Lie Detectors, April 6, 1983, at I
[hereinafter cited as MACNEIL-LEHRER]. See also Hearings on Polygraph Control and
Civil Liberties Protection Act Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 31, 266 (1977-78) [hereinafter
cited as 1977-78 Hearings]; STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., PRIVACY, POLYGRAPHS,
AND EMPLOYMENT 3 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Comm. Print];
Walker, Employee Theft, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 5, 1983, at 6, col. 5.
6. See MACNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 1. This marks a threefold increase since
1974 when approximately 300,000 tests were given.
7. Id. at 1; D. LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD 3 (1981). Lykken indicates 20%
of the tests are administered by the nation's major corporations and 50% of retail compa-
nies. Adolf Coors Brewery, McDonalds, Lehigh Oil Company, Gimbels, Zale Corpora-
tion, and Chase Manhattan Bank allegedly administer polygraph examinations. Id. See
also Bonner, Lie Detectors as Corporate Tools, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 17, 1983, at 4, col. 3;
1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 263. Other articles have indicated one-fourth of all
major corporations administer polygraph examinations. See, e.g., Comment, The Poly-
graph and Pre-Employment Screening, 13 Hous. L. REV. 551, 552 n.8 (1976).
8. See MACNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 1; 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at
31, 270, 279-80.
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vices in the employment relationship. 9 Two primary criticisms spark
serious debate---one, instrument reliability and examiner compe-
tence; and two, intrusion into the privacy of workers. Contrary to the
opinion of industry advocates, opponents contend many honest and
innocent workers are denied employment opportunities.10 Further,
questions addressed to workers often go well beyond the job-related
concerns of employers and at times probe into the most sensitive re-
cesses of a worker's life. This loss of human dignity coupled with a
lack of scientific support for truth verification techniques in employ-
ment refute the claims made by industry that people's lives are not
affected and that judgments about those lives are not made.
The controversy pits the property interests of employers to secure
their businesses and to select employees by their standards against
the privacy interests of workers to be left alone."' This article exam-
ines the controversy surrounding industry's use of truth verification
techniques by describing the theory of those techniques and analyz-
ing the competing interests of employers and employees. This article
proposes regulation of truth verification techniques in the employ-
ment relationship.
THE TRUTH VERIFICATION PROCESS - IN THEORY
Society has always engaged in activities to elicit truthful responses
from individuals. Procedures have ranged from the application of hot
irons to trial by ordeal.1 2 Today, truth verification techniques are
more sophisticated, although similar in theory to their more primi-
tive predecessors.
The most common truth verification device is the polygraph or "lie
detector". However, the polygraph does not detect lies; rather, it
measures observable physiological responses to emotional stress.1"
Theoretically, lying leads to emotional conflict caused by the fear of
detection. More stress results from telling a conscious lie than from
9. See MACNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 1; Bonner, supra note 7, at 4, col. 3;
1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 237; Andrews, The Employer's Lie Detector: How
Fair Is It?, L.A. Daily J., July 29, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
10. See MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 1.
11. The right of privacy was enunciated in 1890 as the "right to be let alone."
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
12. See J. LARSON, LYING AND ITS DETECTION 65-93, 171-253 (1932); Highley-
man, The Deceptive Certainty of the Lie Detector, 10 HASTINGS L. J. 47, 52 (1958);
1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 5 ("Lie detection through physical change is actu-
ally a throwback to early forms of trial by ordeal.") (quoting Skolnick, Scientific Theory
and Scientific'Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L. J. 694, 696 (1961)).
13. See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 212-13.
telling the truth. 14 This induced anxiety results in measurable and
distinguishable physiological changes in pulse rate, blood pressure,
skin conductivity, perspiration rates and breathing amplitude.15
These recorded physiological changes are interpreted by an examiner
who is expected to separate and expose a lie from the truth.'6
The theory underlying truth verification presupposes the examiner
will adopt a proper technique to enable correct diagnosis of test re-
sults. Examinations should be administered in a nonthreatening envi-
ronment free from distraction. Subjects are given a pretest interview
to familiarize them with the questions and to determine the existence
of psychological factors which may preclude a valid process.17 Once
the device is connected, the worker is asked a battery of questions
designed to ferret out lies and eliminate incorrect interpretations.
Three types of questions are addressed most frequently to work-
ers-control, irrelevant, and relevant questions.' 8 The control and ir-
relevant questions establish respectively deceptive and truthful norms
and patterns of responses. The relevant questions are substantive,
specific, and reflect the purpose for the examination. 9 When rele-
vant questions provoke emotional stress with measurable deviations
from truthful baselines, presumably deception is indicated. 0
In summary, the theory underlying truth verification assumes a
correlation exists between prevarication and physiological responses.
It further assumes those changes are measured objectively by truth
verification techniques and interpreted accurately by examiners.2'
14. See Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie
Detection, 70 YALE L. J. 694, 699-700 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie -Detector," 40 IOWA L. REV.
440, 443-47 (1955); Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. REV. 743, 746-
49 (1953); Skolnick, supra note 14, at 700; Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, (in two
parts), 29 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 848, 869-81 and 30 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 104, 104-111 (1939).
16. See Skolnick, supra note 14, at 705-06; D. LYKKEN, supra note 7, at 85.
17. See generally F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION & CRIMINAL INTERROGA-
TION 10-13 (3d ed. 1953); Levitt, supra note 15.
18. See generally Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diag-
nosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 276, 277
(1971); Highleyman, supra note 12, at 55-57.
19. See Polygraph Hearings, supra note 1, at 182-84; J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH
AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 28 (1977) (control
question is "a question about an act of wrongdoing of the same general nature as [that]
under investigation, and. . . [about] which the subject. . . will lie. ") (emphasis in
original).
20. See Horvath & Reid, supra note 18, at 276-77; Skolnick, supra note 14, at
697 et seq.
21. See M. MAYER, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 79 (1972): "The thesis of the machine's
proponents is that lying causes definitive responses that must inevitably show up on the
interpretive chart. From the subject's 'conflict' fear and anxiety are recorded and these
become readable to the expert. Truth is vindicated and falsity exposed."
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THE INTERESTS OF WORKERS
Three workers are requested but not required to submit to poly-
graph examinations-an applicant for a firefighter position; a bar-
tender after money is found missing; and, a manager of a combina-
tion gas station and convenience store even though nothing has been
reported stolen or missing. Each submits to the examination, albeit
reluctantly, fearing that failure to take the test casts an appearance
of dishonesty upon them.22 The workers have corrugated rubber
tubes called pneumographs fastened around their chests and abdo-
mens to measure respiration rates. Two electrodes are connected to
their fingers to measure skin conductivity and cardiosphygometers,
consisting of inflated rubber cuffs placed on their arms, measure
pulse rates and blood pressure.23 Immediately after the devices are
connected, the interrogations begin. Among the questions asked the
prospective firefighter are: Have you had sex with men? Have you
had sex with animals? Have you touched a child with sexual intent?
How often do you masturbate? Do you cheat on your wife? 24 The
applicant is denied employment allegedly based on test results. Ques-
tions addressed to the bartender include: Are you stealing from your
employer? Do you like your boss? 25 The response of "no" to each
question is interpreted by the examiner as truthful. The following
day, the bartender is fired. The manager of the convenience store is
asked questions about where she lives, where her boyfriend lives, her
dating practices, and her drinking habits. Eventually, she is asked:
Did you ever steal anything? After responding "no," the examiner
counters, "Yes you have! Everybody steals!"28 The manager is fired
22. See, e.g., 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 264; City of Miami v. Jervis, 139
So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1962). Refusal to submit to a polygraph may cast suspicion on the
worker. "[I]f you don't take the test one has to surmise there are good reasons why you
don't . . . ." Id. at 516 (emphasis in original). Although the case involved a criminal
investigation, the comment arguably is appropriate in the employment context. See also
Note, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 484, 501 (1927).
23. Comment, The Polygraph in Private Industry: Regulation or Elimination?, 15
BUFFALO L. REV. 655, 658 (1966).
24. Questions allegedly posed by an examiner as described by a firefighter appli-
cant. The Phil Donahue Show, Companies that Require Employees to Take Lie Detector
Examinations, April 14, 1983.
25. Questions allegedly posed by an examiner as described by a bartender. CBS
Evening News, Lie Detectors on the Job, July 28, 1982 (Bernard Goldberg, reporting).
26. Questions allegedly posed by an examiner as described by a manager. Bonner,
supra note 7, at 4, col. 4. A jury recently awarded $219,000 to the manager and 21
others who were dismissed after taking or refusing to take polygraphs. Id. at 4, col. 3; see
also MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 1. It was alleged that plaintiffs "suffered from
emotional distress, acute personal embarrassment, loss of wages and earnings, and public
shortly thereafter. Each worker found the experience frightening, de-
grading, abusive, and humiliating.27
The preceding experiences heighten concerns over the use of
polygraphs in employment. Those concerns become more compelling
if the process is unreliable in discerning the truth. Opponents of cor-
porate "lie detection" voice two primary criticisms of the truth verifi-
cation process. First, the process is patently unfair. To deny employ-
ment and destroy reputations solely on the basis of an examination
with questionable accuracy and reliability is unconscionable. 28 Sec-
ond, the process is inherently intrusive.29 While the device is operat-
ing, examinees are "deprive[d] . . . of any control over divulging
information about [themselves]."3 ° Further, questions which intrude
into highly personal areas of workers' lives, eliciting intimate state-
ments or compelling self-incrimination by confessions of past crimi-
nal conduct, are looked upon with disapprobation.
Accuracy and Reliability
For decades, the polygraph industry and the scientific and aca-
demic communities have debated the accuracy and reliability of
truth verification devices.31 Concern has focused on three areas: the
empirical verification of the process, the emotional state of the ex-
aminee, and the competence of the examiner.
Empirical Verification
Empirical studies of polygraph reliability have focused on its use
in criminal investigations. Few of those studies provide an indepen-
dent assessment of accuracy. 2 This lack of independent empirical
verification is compounded in the employment context where no data
humiliation and from mental and psychological trauma." Bonner, supra note 5, at 4, col.
3. See also J. REID & INBAU, supra note 19, at 28-29. If examinees respond "no" when
asked, "Did you steal anything?" examiners are instructed to ask: "Did you ever try to
steal anything?"
27. See supra notes 24-26.
28. Skolnick, supra note 14, at 727.
29. See, e.g., PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN
AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 239 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY COMMISSION]; Her-
mann, Privacy, The Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Re-
strict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REv. 73, 153 (1971).
30. PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 239. See also 1977-78 Hearings,
supra note 5, at 263.
31. Compare J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 19; Cureton, A Consensus as to the
Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 TENN. L. REV. 728 (1953); Trovillo, Scientific
Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. REv. 743 (1953); with Highleyman, supra note 12;
Levitt, supra note 15; Skolnick, supra note 14, at 694.
32. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 9 "[These studies] tend to appear in
trade journals [and] in unedited nonscientific journals." Id. at 247. See also 1974 Comm.
Print, supra note 5, at 6; A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 212; Burkey, Privacy, Property
and the Polygraph, 18 LAB. L.J. 79, 80-81 (1967).
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on its accuracy has been compiled.33 While acknowledging an accu-
racy rate of 90% in criminal investigations, David Raskin, a noted
scholar and psychologist on the accuracy of the polygraph, submits
its accuracy in employment situations could be "no better than flip-
ping a coin."34 This discrepancy in assessment is in large part be-
cause of the differences between criminal and employment investiga-
tions.35 In criminal investigations, suspects have a constitutional
right to refuse, without prejudice, taking an examination. In employ-
ment investigations workers may be required to submit to the exami-
nations or face firing for their refusal.3 6 The coercive nature of such
an examination environment reduces the examination's accuracy.3 7
Further, the issues raised in a criminal investigation are specific
("Did you rob the National Bank last Wednesday?"), whereas those
raised in an employment investigation are frequently broad and
vague ("Have you ever stolen anything?"). The examiner is asking
about prior thefts while the employee may be responding about the
pen she or he failed to return to work.38 The more specific the ques-
tions, the greater the accuracy of the examination. 9 Unlike criminal
investigations where the incident being investigated has occurred,
employment investigations, particularly those involving pre-screening
of prospective employees, diagnose tendencies to cause incidents in
the future.40 Thus, an examinee's present honesty and future behav-
ior is predicated on an assessment of general statements concerning
past conduct. 41 These "fortune-telling" techniques are highly specu-
lative indicators of employee behavior and bring into question the
33. See MACNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 5 (Professor Raskin).
34. Id. See also 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 24. "[T]here is every reason to
doubt that [polygraphs] are any more accurate than, say, using a Ouija board." Id. at
445.
35. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 428-30; Bonner, supra note 7, at 4, col.
6 (Professor Raskin); Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs as "Lie Detectors" by the
Federal Government Before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38
(1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Hearings].
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V; See MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 4 (Professor
Raskin); 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 434.
37. MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 4. See also 1977-78 Hearings, supra note
5, at 3. "One of the basic requirements for obtaining highly accurate results ... is the
voluntary cooperation of the subject." Id. at 434.
38. MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 4. See also Hermann, supra note 29, at
85.
39. MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 4. See also 1977-78 Hearings, supra note
5, at 435-36, 446; Hermann, supra note 29, at 85.
40. Hermann, supra note 29, at 85; 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 4.
41. See Hermann, supra note 29, at 85.
accuracy of test interpretations.42 As one noted psychiatrist testified,
"We have no way of determining whether an individual will . . or
will not be a good worker, or will . . . or will not be reliable, or will
. . . or will not steal."43
Although industry advocates recognize "the accuracy of the tech-
nique is difficult to estimate,""" they nevertheless continue to pro-
mote the preciseness of the process. The statistic cited most fre-
quently is an accuracy rate of 95% in criminal investigations with a
4% margin of indefinite determination and a 1% margin of possible
error.45 Those results assume the polygraph is operated by a well-
trained, competent examiner using solid procedure and technique in
a specific-issue examination.46 Despite the impressive figures, only
18.9% of those interpretive findings were verified.47 Critics thus
charge these figures are misleading" even though more recent stud-
ies have also found accuracy rates between 70 and 90%.49 Because
methods of verification are limited to subsequent confessions of guilt
or uncontrovertible evidence of innocence, it is nearly impossible to
provide empirically acceptable performance data.50 This inability to
verify test results is further aggravated in the employment context
where follow-up with job applicants is nearly impossible.51 Regard-
less of the accuracy rates in criminal investigations, no conclusive
statistical data on the accuracy of the polygraph in employment situ-
ations exists.52 Nevertheless, industry champions continue to create
42. Several studies have indicated approximately 30% of applicants fail the test.
Laymon, Lie Detectors-Detection by Deception, 10 S. DAKOTA L. REV. 1, 31 (1965). See
also 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 45 (three out of every four workers fail the test).
43. 1964 Hearings, supra note 35, at 304. Ten years later, this same conclusion
was reached by a Senate subcommittee: "The fitness of the polygraph as a predicting
device, while its accuracy as an indicator of past conduct remains questionable, must be
even more improbable." 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 4.
44. Inbau & Reid, The Lie-Detector Technique: A Reliable and Valuable Investi-
gative Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 470, 472 (1964).
45. Based on a five-year study of 4,280 suspects of criminal offenses by a leading
polygraph firm, not representing the entire industry. Of this number, 64.5% were re-
ported as innocent; 31.1% guilty; and 4.4% indefinite. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note
17, at 111; J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 19, at 304.
46. See MACNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 5-6.
47. 1964 Hearings, supra note 35, at 32. However, of those subjects reported
guilty, only 59.3% were "interrogated with the aim of obtaining a confession" and of
these, only 61.4% did confess. Thus, only 36% of the individuals who were reported guilty
by polygraphs were actually verified as such. Sternbach, Gustafson & Colier, Don't
Trust the Lie Detector, 40 HARV. Bus. REV. Dec. 1962, 127, 130 [hereinafter cited as
Sternbach].
48. See Skolnick, supra note 14, at 699.
49. See 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 5-6 (citing several studies with accu-
racy ranging from 79.1 to 91.4%); Polygraph Hearings, supra note 1, at 505 (76%).
50. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 441; 1964 Hearings, supra note 35, at
426-27.
51. See Note, Lie Detectors in Private Employment: A Proposal for Balancing
Interests, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 934 (1965).
52. See MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 5 (Professor Raskin); 1977-78 Hear-
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an aura of infallibility by adducing a 90% accuracy figure for em-
ployment-related use.53
Examinee Condition
The emotional and physical state of the examinee plays a signifi-
cant role in the reliability of test diagnosis. Accurate results depend
on the existence of stress induced by fear of detection. " Therefore,
the examinee must be convinced the device is infallible. Absent such
fear, the likelihood of a correct diagnosis is marginal at best because
the subject is unresponsive.55
Of particular significance to opponents, however, is that many
mental states and impairments, besides lying, cause physiological re-
sponses which distort the truth verification process and defeat its va-
lidity. These include emotional tension, physiological and mental ab-
normalities, fatigue, and prolonged interrogation.5 6 Even a truthful
person feels stress, fear, or anger at being subjected to polygraph
examination. Extreme nervousness or excessive anxiety may cause an
unusually conscientious person, when faced with questions of guilt or
innocence, to reflect a false-positive-innocent but reporting physio-
logical changes diagnosed as deceptive. 57 Resentment towards feeling
compelled to submit to the examination and towards the highly per-
sonal questions asked may also evoke emotional reactions "indistin-
guishable from ... deception. ' 58 Other outside stimuli, including a
ings, supra note 5, at 24, 41 (a polygraph industry spokesperson stated, "[T]here has not
been a study conducted in the pre-employment situation.. .. I do not think anyone has
yet derived such a structure wherein such a study could be made"). See also id. at 247,
398, 436, 447; Polygraph Hearings, supra note 1, at 163.
53. See MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 5; The Phil Donahue Show, Compa-
nies that Require Employees to Take Lie Detector Examinations, April 14, 1983.
54. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
55. See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 19, at 215-16. To be responsive, the sub-
jects must feel powerless. Laymon, supra note 42, at 5. They must "fear the possibility of
discovery and punishment." LEE, THE INSTRUMENTAL DETECTION OF DECEPTION 77
(1953).
56. Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, 504-6, cert denied, 342
U.S. 898 (1951); See F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 17, at 65-66; 1964 Hearings,
supra note 35, at 450; Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. on the Impeach-
ment of the President, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. STATEMENT OF INFORMATION, bk. VII, pt. 2
at 881 (1974) ("I don't know anything about polygraphs and I don't know how accurate
they are, but I know they'll scare the hell out of people") (statement by Richard M.
Nixon, July 24, 1971) (emphasis added).
57. See MACNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 1. A false-positive occurs when a per-
son is reported guilty but is in fact innocent; a false-negative is the converse. See also
1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 32, 443, 447; 1964 Hearings, supra note 35, at 292,
369, 450; F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 17, at 66-71.
58. Bonner, supra note 7, at 4, col. 4 (Professor Raskin). See also 1977-78 Hear-
distracting environment or an argumentative examiner, may be dis-
ruptive to the testing situation and adversely affect the reliability of
the results.59 The most celebrated illustration of this phenomenon in-
volved a bank officer who confessed to embezzlements which subse-
quent audits revealed never occurred.6 0 The young officer actually
believed what he said was true. Because a polygraph is limited essen-
tially to verifying truthful statements and is incapable of determin-
ing actual facts,6 the examiner was convinced the employee was
guilty of embezzlement.
Examiner Competence
Claims of accuracy are dependent upon the method of test admin-
istration, the interpretation of test results, and the evaluation of ex-
aminee behavior.62 Thus, examiner competence is the crucial com-
ponent of the truth verification process.63 Leading polygraph propo-
nents concur "the most important factor involved in the use of any..
. [lie detection] instrument is the ability, experience, education and
integrity of the examiner. . . ." The examiner must also have the
personal character and sensitivity to acquire the trust and coopera-
tion of the examinee . 5 Many workers feel accused when requested
to submit to a polygraph examination and realize their innocence
can be established only by a pernicious machine. This reversal in the
Ings, supra note 5, at 435.
59. See Skolnick, supra note 14, at 697; 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 8; A.
WESTIN, supra note 4, at 213.
60. See Dearman & Smith, Unconscious Motivation and the Polygraph Test, 119
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1017 (1963). The employer routinely required polygraph examina-
tions. Although an audit after the first examination failed to reveal shortages, the second
and third polygraphs convinced the examiner that the bank employee had stolen money.
Again, the audits failed to uncover any shortages. Later, psychiatrists treating the em-
ployee found he had deep-seated guilt feelings towards his mother and wife, who were
customers of the bank.
61. See 1964 Hearings, supra note 35, at 325. "If the patient said he was Napo-
leon, and if he believed this, the lie detector response indicated that he was telling the
truth." Id. at 290.
62. See F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 17, at 112; Moenssens, Polygraph Test
Results Meet Standards for Admissibility as Evidence, in LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
POLYGRAPH 14 (N. Anseley ed. 1975); Horvath & Reid, supra note 18, at 281; Note,
The Polygraph Technique: A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 330, 332, 347-48
(1971).
63. It has been estimated that examiner interpretations account for the 95% "accu-
racy" rate of polygraph determinations. See F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 17, at 112;
Skolnick, supra note 14, at 699; 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 249 ("[t]he exam-
iner is the 'lie detector' "); Moenssens, supra note 62, at 21 ("the polygraph is very
accurate when used by a competent examiner").
64. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 19, at 5. Further, inexperienced examiners
have a high percentage of inaccurate interpretations. According to Horvath & Reid, the
inexperienced examiners were found to be only 79.1% accurate while experienced were
91.4% accurate. Horvath & Reid, supra note 18, at 279.
65. See generally 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 9.
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presumption of innocence66 causes workers to be distrustful of a pro-
cess which is totally devoid of procedural safeguards. 67
Because the analytical determinations of physiological responses
are highly subjective, requiring the application of several disciplines
including physiology and psychology, 8 experts agree that an exam-
iner should possess a college degree and at least five years of investi-
gative experience to be considered minimally qualified. 9 These same
experts acknowledge, however, that "only about 20 percent of the
individuals who hold themselves out as examiners possess ... the
training and skill required for competence in [the] field."170 Argua-
bly, 80% of polygraph determinations are of questionable credi-
bility. 1
Intrusiveness
Critics charge that a far more compelling reason to moderate the
use of truth verification in employment is its intrusiveness into work-
ers' lives. 2 By submitting to the examination, a worker's privacy is
invaded by two forms of intrusion-one, an inability to refrain from
divulging information about themselves73 and two, a loss of personal
66. Declared John E. Reid, director of a major polygraph company, "I also believe
that a person who is innocent owes society an obligation to cooperate and help the au-
thorities prove him innocent rather than be defiant and say, 'let them try to prove my
guilt.'" 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 4. See also 1977-78 Hearings, supra note
5, at 256.
67. See 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 2-3.
68. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 249; 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5,
at 9; Moenssens, supra note 62, at 14-15; Skolnick, supra note 14, at 695, 707.
69. See 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 9; Polygraph Hearings, supra note 1,
at 28.
70. Inbau & Reid, supra note 44, at 473. See also Polygraph Hearings, supra
note 1, at 29; Moenssens, supra note 62, at 15 ("The law cannot allow incompetent
operators to qualify as expert(s). . .. "); A. MOENSSENS, R. MosEs & F. INBAU, SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 543 (1973) ("There are, unfortunately, relatively
few persons holding themselves out as Polygraph examiners who have the required quali-
fications . . . ."). Further, it is alleged that examiners used by private employers tend to
be of a lower quality than examiners used in criminal investigations. See MAcNEIL-
LEHRER, supra note 5, at 5. It has also been reported that polygraph operators admit
many employers hire examiners not on the basis of quality of service but price. See Bus.
WK., Feb. 6, 1978, at 104. This has been confirmed in hearings before the Judiciary
Committee. 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 260, 289, 321.
71. As Senator Sam Ervin noted, "It seems most likely that the 80 percent would
do more harm than the 20 percent would do good." Views of Our Readers, 50 A.B.A. J.
602 (1964). For interesting anecdotes "substantiat[ing] these conclusions," see Burkey,
supra note 32, at 81-84.
72. See Hermann, supra note 29, at 153-54.
73. Id. at 130, 153.
dignity from potentially dehumanizing questions. 4
The theory underlying polygraph examinations rests on the mea-
surement of physiological responses. 5 Once the device is connected,
the monitoring and recording of those responses begin and continue
throughout the interrogation.7 6 Physiological responses are recorded
regardless of whether answers are verbalized.7 7 Thus, a worker's si-
lence to questions she or he chooses not to answer nevertheless elicits
physiological responses interpreted as truthful or deceptive by an ex-
aminer.7  The intrusion occurs by the worker's inability to determine
"when and under what conditions . . . thoughts, speech, and acts
should be revealed to others.179 This loss of testimonial control is
particularly troublesome to workers who involuntarily incriminate
themselves for past conduct, despite the noncriminality of the inves-
tigation. 80 Any external dissemination of examiner interpretations
only serves to magnify the intrusiveness into, and the loss of control
by workers over, their private affairs. 81
74. Id. at 154.
75. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
76. See generally 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 263; Hermann, supra note
29, at 129.
77. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 255-56, 263.
78. See id. at 249, 263.
79. Hermann, supra note 29, at 127-28. See also PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra
note 29, at 239; Kaganiec, Lie-Detector Tests and "Freedom of the Will" in Germany,
51 NW. U.L. REV. 446, 446-52 (1956).
80. See REPORT ON THE USE OF POLYGRAPHS AS "LIE DETECTORS" BY THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT BASED ON A STUDY BY THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERN-
MENT INFORMATION SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
H.R. REPORT No. 198, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965
REPORT]. "The polygraph technique forces an individual to incriminate himself and con-
fess to past actions which are not pertinent to the current investigation." Id. For a discus-
sion of fifth amendment concerns in the private context, despite the lack of state action,
see Hermann, supra note 29, at 130-31. Language contained in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966), suggests polygraph responses are testimonial: "Some tests
seemingly directed to obtain 'physical evidence,' for example, lie detector tests. . . may
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a
person to submit to [such] testing . . . is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth
Amendment." See also Markson, A Reexamination of the Role of Lie Detectors in
Labor Relations, 22 LAB. L.J. 394, 400-01 (1971).
81. Since the information is not privileged, examiners and employers can supply
incriminating details to other employers and agencies. A CBS news broadcast compared
the external dissemination of polygraph results to an inaccurate credit rating, following
employees from job to job. CBS Evening News, Lie Detectors On-the-Job, July 28, 1982.
See Hermann, supra note 29, at 96; 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 262; 1964 Hear-
Ings, supra note 35, at 373 (Congressman Moss remarked that worker lie detector exam-
inations result in "dossiers [being] built up and transferred from one employer to another
and permanent prejudice can be created.") See also 1965 REPORT, supra note 80, at 19-
20 ("The polygraph operator and his superiors then decide whether to refer derogatory
information to other agencies or officials."); 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 4. See
also Peller v. Retail Credit Co., 359 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1973), afl'd, 505 F.2d 733
(5th Cir. 1974) (worker failed pre-employment polygraph examination and was denied
employment by Employer 1. Examiner supplied results to a credit reporting agency.
Worker was hired by Employer 2 but was subsequently fired because of polygraph results
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The privacy of a worker's life is diminished further by the nature
and extent of inquiry during the examination . 2 Opponents charge
that workers are subjected to numerous intrusive questions about
their personal thoughts, attitudes, beliefs, and sexual habits, which
are irrelevent to and go well beyond the job-related concerns of em-
ployers.8 3 By probing the "inner domains" of workers, the questions
interfere with their personal autonomy. 84 Not only are some ques-
tions highly offensive but they may reduce the accuracy of test re-
sults.85 Commented one critic, "[The examinations are] abusive to
the employee and virtually useless to the employer." '
Acknowledging some private users abuse polygraph examinations,
the American Polygraph Association claims reputable examiners are
encouraged not to ask unethical questions, particularly those con-
cerning political affiliations, religious beliefs, sexual habits, and
union activities.8 7 A review of a polygraph technician's instruction
manual, however, prompted one author to categorize the recom-
mended interrogation into the following four areas:
[F]irst, questions about past dishonesty or criminal activity, detected or un-
detected, related or unrelated to work; second, questions about past work
record and attitude toward the job for which application is being made, and
underlying motives for seeking employment; third, questions about mental
or physical problems, or about family difficulties which may affect work
activity; and fourth, questions about accident experiences, personal habits,
political activity and personal associations.18
The nature of the questions and their accompanying comments sug-
gest examiners are to elicit not only intimately personal revelations
but also unwarranted explanatory remarks, enabling the extraction
of even more personal information. 9 Arguably, the dignity of work-
ers is compromised and their integrity impugned.
supplied by credit agency during a background check of the employee.).
82. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
83. See MAcNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 2-3, 5. Opponents claim examiners
ask questions which are legally prohibited for employers to ask. Bonner, supra note 7, at
4, col. 3. See also 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 249-250, 255 (no realistic limit on
the types of questions to be asked exists); 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 1.
84. See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 237-38.
85. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
86. Bonner, supra note 7, at 4, col. 5 (quoting Norma Rollins, director of the Pri-
vacy Project, New York Civil Liberties Union).
87. Id. at col. 6. See also MACNEIL-LEHRER, supra note 5, at 6.
88. Hermann, supra note 29, at 82-84 (after reviewing R. FERGUSON, THE POLY-
GRAPH IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY 128-51 (1966)).
89. Id. at 83-4. For sample questions and comments, see id. at 82-84, nn.40-44.
THE REMEDIES OF WORKERS
Workers denied employment opportunities on the basis of truth
verification procedures have few remedies available to them. The ab-
sence of federal legislation"0 and state involvement 1 and the difficul-
ties of establishing actionable torts92 effectively limit sources of
worker recovery. Arbitration proceedings, where applicable, and
statutes, where available, afford most worker protections.
Arbitration Proceedings
The field of labor arbitration provides extensive decisional author-
ity to assess the status of truth verification in employment relation-
90. Although federal legislation imposes certain restrictions on employer incursions
into employee privacy, none specifically provides private-sector employee relief from
truth verification examinations. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982) (pro-
tects privacy of federal employees); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982)
(protects individuals from inaccurate information in a consumer report used as a factor
in determining employment). Cf Peller v. Retail Credit Co., 359 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D.
Ga. 1973), affd 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982) (proscribes deliberate interception of com-
munications); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (prohibits employers from acquiring or attempting to acquire information regard-
ing employee protected activities and from refusing to bargain over such items as the use
of truth verification devices).
91. Despite arguments in support of extending amendments IV (unreasonable
searches), V (self-incrimination) and VI (denial of counsel) to the private employment
setting, with attendant ability to address employee concerns with truth verification tech-
niques, no constitutional protection has been afforded. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); Spelfogel, Surveillance and Interrogation in Plant Theft and
Discipline Cases, N.Y.U. 21st ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 171, 172 (1969); Hermann, supra
note 29, at 140-49; 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 37, 314-15; Falick, The Lie De-
tector and the Right to Privacy, 40 N.Y. ST. B. J. 102 (1968). One author suggested
workers denied employment should seek unemployment compensation. If denied benefits
on the basis of recognition of employer polygraph results, the worker could then argue
state action exists and thus, constitutional arguments are appropriate. Comment, supra
note 7, at 557.
92. Possible tort causes of action include intentional infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, and invasion of privacy. In view of the employer's defenses of consent and
privilege, however, tort actions against employers are difficult to maintain. See infra text
accompanying notes 131-140. For example, intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires "conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . . ." W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 56 (4th ed. 1971). Employer behavior in
the use of truth verification techniques may not reach the level of outrageousness deemed
necessary to constitute such tortious conduct. Defamation in the employment context
usually arises when the employer communicates to another (e.g., prospective employer,
co-worker) derogatory worker information (e.g., polygraph results). Id. at 754. Em-
ployer defenses of truth and qualified privilege frequently preclude employee recovery.
Workers encounter similar defenses in seeking recovery for tortious invasion of privacy.
The tort consists of four distinct categories: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude or
into private affairs; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light in the public eye;
and (4) appropriation of name or likeness. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389
(1960). One commentator has argued that truth verification techniques threaten human
dignity and, as such, constitute a tortious invasion of privacy. Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1003-07
(1964).
308
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ships. Workers challenging the reasonableness of security devices
generally are those protected by collective bargaining agreements.93
Organized labor has fought to restrict polygraph examinations in
employment, and has at times successfully negotiated a ban on their
use.9 Absent total prohibition, most collective bargaining agree-
ments provide for grievance procedures which have, as their final ad-
judicator of disputes, the arbitration process.95 Although following
rules of procedural due process, the proceedings permit "equitable
considerations and matters of policy" to influence arbitrator deci-
sions.96 Thus, where management practices egregiously compromise
the personal integrity of employees, claims of industrial efficiency
may be obviated by claims of intrusion into employee privacy.97
The evidentiary value of truth verification techniques has been dis-
puted most frequently in the context of employee dismissals. Arbi-
trators are called upon to determine whether employers have estab-
lished just cause for dismissals, when those dismissals are predicated
upon polygraph results or on refusals to submit to the examina-
tions.98 Parroting the judicial view,99 the majority of arbitration deci-
sions either have disallowed polygraph evidence or have assigned it
93. While union employees benefit from these efforts, job applicants who are un-
protected by collective bargaining agreements are still subject to polygraph examinations.
See Burkey, supra note 32, at 79; Hermann, supra note 29, at 92.
94. See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 218-21; 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at
306.
95. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 518-522 (9th ed. 1980).
96. Stone, Due Process in Labor Arbitration, N.Y.U. 24TH ANN. CONF. ON LA-
BOR 11, 11 (1972).
97. See Burkey, Employee Surveillance: Are There Civil Rights for the Man on
the Job?, N.Y.U. 21sT ANN. CONF. ON LABOR, 199, 214 (1969); Edwards, Due Process
Considerations in Labor Arbitration, 25 ARB. J. 141 (1970).
98. See Paramount Wedding Ring Co. v. Amalgamated Indus. Prod., Sales &
Jewelry Wkrs Union, Local 4, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1202, 1204 (1978) (Fish, Arb.)
where, while recognizing the company's right "to protect its valuable inventory," an arbi-
trator ruled:
The courts and arbitrators are agreed that the results of polygraph tests are not
evidence. In spite of the claims of those giving the tests the reaction of the indi-
viduals to the tests vary with the individuals and, therefore, are not conclusive
.... The company presented no evidence, outside of the tests. . .. Without
such evidence the company has not carried its burden of proving 'good and suffi-
cient cause' for the discharges ....
See also Burkey, supra note 32, at 86-87.
99. "[The] test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert
testimony . . . . " Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); See also
United States v. Cochran, 499 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124
(1975); United States v. Watts, 502 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1974); State v. Hill, 40 Ohio
App.2d 16, 317 N.E.2d 233 (1974).
little probative value, on grounds of insufficient scientific support for
the device's accuracy.1oo Decisions rejecting polygraph evidence have
also considered issues of employee privacy. 101 As early as 1958, arbi-
trators intimated the protection of civil liberties may be paramount:
Although new wonders of technology are brought home to us every day, the
time has not yet come when managements can consign to a machine the job
of supervision, especially when this machine is to take the employee in its
embrace and measure his most intimate vital processes.102
Subsequently, in Lag Drug Company v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Lo-
cal 743, the arbitrator declared the process does "invade the right of
privacy and the constitutional right against self-incrimination."103
The exclusion of polygraph results by arbitrators has been judicially
upheld. 0°
State Statutes
The condemnation of truth verification techniques in employment
has resulted in statutory circumscription of their use at the state
level. 10 5 Several states have enacted legislation either prohibiting or
100. See, e.g., Temtex Prod. Inc. v. Stove, Furnace, & Allied Appliance Workers
Local 53, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233 (1980) (Rimer, Arb.); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
United Steelworkers Local 6787, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 581, 582-83 (1977) (Seward,
Arb.); Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Int'l Union of Dist. 50, Local 13600, 59 Lab. Arb.(BNA) 283, 287-291 (1972) (Murphy, Arb.); Sanna Dairies Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters Local 354, 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 16 (1964) (Rice, Arb.); Louis Zahn Drug Co. v.
Warehouse Local 743, 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 352 (1963) (Sembower, Arb.); Lag Drug
Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 743, 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1121 (1962) (Kelliher,
Arb.); Continental Air Transp. Co. v. Auto Local 727, 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 778, 780(1962) (Eiger, Arb.); B.F. Goodrich Tire Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 743, 36
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 552 (1961) (Ryder, Arb.); Marathon Flee. Mfg. Corp. v. UAW Local
1116, 31 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1040, 1041 (1959) (Duff, Arb.). See also 1974 Comm. Print,
supra note 5, at 14-15.
101. See, e.g., Town & Country Food Co. v. United Packinghouses Local 753, 39
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 332, 335 (1962) (Lewis, Arb.) ("Under such circumstances, the Com-
pany's demand that the four men take the 'lie detector' test or face discharge for insubor-
dination was an invasion of privacy and an unreasonable and unwarranted exercise of
management rights."); Lag Drug Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 743, 39 Lab. Arb.(BNA) 1121, 1123 (1962) ( Kelliher, Arb.); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. System Council T-4,
39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 470, 479 (1962) (Ryder, Arb.). See also 1974 Comm. Print, supra
note 5, at 15.
102. General Am. Transp. Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 1133, 31 Lab. Arb.(BNA) 355, 364 (1958) (Sembower, Arb.) (emphasis added).
103. 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1121, 1123 (1962) (Kelliher, Arb.).
104. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc.,
481 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1973).
105. In enacting California's statutory prohibition, the legislature concluded that
polygraphs were inaccurate when operated by inexperienced personnel, and that their use
created an employment environment filled with "suspense and distrust between employ-
ers and employees." Review of Selected 1963 Legislation, 38 CAL ST. B.J. 604, 734(1963). The primary concern of states regulating polygraph examinations appears to be
the unreliability of the techniques not the invasion of worker privacy. Hermann, supra
note 29, at 101-102.
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substantially limiting the use of polygraph examinations 0 6 while
other states require competency-based licensing of examiners.107 Dis-
tinctions in the wording of these statutes, however, reflect their rela-
tive strength in proscribing employer conduct.
To preclude involuntary administration of polygraphs, states regu-
lating their use generally prohibit employers from "requiring or de-
manding" submission to the examinations as a "condition of employ-
ment."108 Employers, however, are not proscribed from "requesting"
that workers submit to such testing.109 Thus, under those statutes,
voluntary utilization of polygraph testing is permissible. 110 To pre-
clude employers from subtly yet coercively "requesting" polygraphs,
a few states have adopted a more restrictive approach by prohibiting
employers from "influencing," "requesting" or "suggesting" submis-
sion to those examinations. 1 Regardless of the statutory language,
workers are permitted to suggest their own submission to polygraph
testing.
106. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1972); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51g (West Supp. 1983-1984); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-21 to -22 (1976). State courts
have upheld statutory restrictions recognizing a legitimate state interest in regulating
polygraph use in employment and finding sufficient reasonableness in the exercise of po-
lice power. See, e.g., State v. Community Distributors, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 589, 594,
304 A.2d 213, 216 (County Ct. 1973), affd 64 N.J. 479, 487, 317 A.2d 697, 701 (1974);
Dovalina v. Albert, 409 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
107. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 34, §§ 25-1 to -36 (1977 & Supp. 1981); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32.2701-.2715 (1976 & Supp. 1981); ARK. STAT ANN. §§ 71-2201 to
-2225 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.561-.569 (Vest 1981); GA. CODE §9 84-5001 to
-5016 (1975).
108. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (Deering Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
31-51g (West Supp. 1983-1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 198 (West Supp.
1981).
109. See 43 OP. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 25 (1964). In interpreting the California stat-
ute to permit employer requests, the Attorney General commented no clear criteria were
established to distinguish requests from demands. Id. at 27.
110. See Hermann, supra note 29, at 98.
111. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1972) (require, request, or suggest);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51g (West Supp. 1983-1984) (request or require); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1979) (require, request, or suggest). See also State v. Community
Distributors, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 589, 598, 304 A.2d 213, 219 (County Ct. 1973), affd
64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974), where the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the
statutory prohibition against suggesting a polygraph test under any circumstance. The
defendant-employer maintained he had merely "inquired of" employees whether they
would "volunteer" for testing. The court held:
It is eminently clear that, although defendant's prospective employees are only
"requested" to submit to lie detector tests, they are in fact "influenced" to do so
psychologically by being introduced to an establishment where many employees
take the tests.
Id. at 598, 304 A.2d at 218.
In an attempt to upgrade the quality of examiners and thereby
improve the accuracy of test interpretations, some states have en-
acted legislation establishing licensing standards for polygraph oper-
ators.11 Although a number of statutes include similar minimum
criteria for education and training,' 13 the balance of licensing re-
quirements vary from state to state."" Many statutes contain grand-
father clauses which permit anyone with five years of investigative
experience to administer polygraph examinations even though no cri-
teria for evaluating that experience are defined by the statutes. A
majority of statutes obligate prospective examiners to graduate from
approved schools of polygraphy," 5 while a few require their serving
internships prior to licensing."a6 Some states attempt to assure uni-
form and objective standards by mandating that prospective licen-
sees pass competency examinations. 1" A few statutes impose restric-
tions which limit the nature of questions raised by examiners,
particularly those regarding religion, labor affiliation, prior arrest
records, and sexual activities. 18 Sanctions imposed for violation of
the statutes usually are misdemeanors punishable by small fines or
imprisonment or both." 9
112. See supra note 107.
113. States requiring examiners to possess a baccalaureate degree or five years
experience as an investigator are, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-25-21(5) (1977); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 71-2207 (1976); GA. CODE § 84-5007 (1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, §
2412(F) (1978 & Supp. 1981); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 338.1710 (1970 & Supp. 1981);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-29-13 (1973); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 1458 (West 1980); OR.
REV. STAT. § 703-090(e) (1979); S.C. CODE § 40-53-70 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-
37-5(b) (1974).
114. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2703 (1976) (minimum age of 18 years);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.568 (West 1981) (insurance requirement); OR. REV. STAT. §§
703.090(b) (1979) (citizen of U.S.). See also 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 16("the requirements placed upon examiners and the restrictions imposed on employers fall
far short of the strong stand that should be taken against polygraphs.").
115. E.g., ALA. CODE § 34-25-21(b) (1977); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.2703
(1976); GA. CODE § 84-5007(0 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7155(D) (Supp.
1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 703.090(f) (1979); VA. CODE § 54-920 (1978).
116. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 703.090(f) (1979) (200 tests); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 34-37-5(2)(d) (Supp. 1979) (100 tests).
117. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 34, 35-21(7) (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.2207(1976); ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 111, § 2412(3) (1978 & Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-49.3(e) (1975).
118. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.2701 (1976); VA. CODE § 40.1-51.4:3(1981).
119. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2715 (1976) (fine from $300 to $1000
and/or six months in jail); ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 111 § 2429 (1978 & Supp. 1981) (fine
from $25 to $500 and/or six months in jail); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-29-45 (1973) (fine
from $100 to $1000 and/or six months in jail); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-49.8 (1975) (mis-
demeanor penalty); OR. REV. STAT. § 703.990 (1979) (fine up to $1000).
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RESPONSES OF EMPLOYERS
Confronted with theft losses in the billions of dollars annually,
business became fascinated with truth verification techniques as a
method of apprehending employee-miscreants. 20 Since those em-
ployees operate undetected within an organization for an average of
three years, employers extended polygraph examinations to ferret
out the honest from the dishonest applicant. 121 Having embraced the
procedures for incidents of theft and for prescreening of applicants,
business initiated periodic testing of current employees to act as a
deterrent to wrong-doing. 22 Eminent polygraphers, however, advised
business that lie detector examinations are most effective when used
only as one aspect of personnel evaluation. 123 Despite this advice,
business proceeded to embrace truth verification as the prime deter-
minant of employment status, pointing to reductions in employee
peculations 24 and identification of dishonest applicants. 25 Buoyed
by the results, business focused its detection efforts primarily at the
pre-employment stage and broadened the scope of inquiry. To avoid
lengthy and costly background confirmations, 28 polygraph examin-
ers began verifying intentions of job permanency and information on
job applications. 27 With few restraints, the interrogations of pro-
spective and current employees frequently include "any specific
questions the employer wants answered," 28 including those concern-
ing sexual activities, drug habits, and attitudes. 29 Polygraph admin-
istratioh also is developing into a "management tool [by] which the
most honest and reliable people can be promoted to higher positions
in the company." 30 As criticism mounts against the use of the truth
verification process, employers offer two responses: one, employers
have the right to protect their property from untrustworthy individu-
als and two, prospective and current employees consent to test
administration.
Considered as employer prerogatives, business maintains it has the
120. See supra note 5.
121. See 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 3.
122. See supra note 4.
123. See Inbau & Reid, supra note 44, at 473.
124. See supra note 8.
125. See Bonner, supra note 7, at 4, col. 3.
126. See 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 3; 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5,
at 37.
127. See Note, supra note 51, at 937.
128. Evans, supra note 2, at 10A, col. 1.
129. Id. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
130. Id.
right to require employees to comply with any order which is not in
violation of the law, reasonable safety standards, collective bargain-
ing agreements or individual constitutional rights. 131 As such, the in-
terests of employers in protecting their property from dishonest em-
ployees, in reducing the time and costs of background verifications,
and in recognizing the truthfulness of employees, justify requiring
the submission of workers to polygraph examinations as a condition
of employment. 132 Since workers have no basic common law right to
secure or retain employment, employers submit they can establish
standards and conditions to govern the employment relationship, in-
cluding the use of truth verification techniques.1 33
In addition to claiming management prerogatives, companies fre-
quently insist current and prospective employees sign consent and/or
waiver forms agreeing to submit to the examinations. 34 General un-
limited consents may be requested also, thereby permitting employ-
ers to conduct polygraph testing whenever they deem necessary. 13 5
These actions allegedly absolve the employer and examiner from any
liability in connection with the techniques. 36 On occasion, workers
grant employers blanket authority to use test results as they choose,
enabling companies to forward those results to subsequent employ-
ers.1 37 By signing consent forms, workers are said to be voluntarily
submitting to the examinations. 38 This assertion is made even
though current employees who decline to volunteer may be faced
with job sanctions.139 Similarly, job applicants who fail to consent to
testing may not be considered for employment. 40
THE COMPETING INTERESTS ANALYZED
The increasing use of truth verification techniques by business is
certain to heighten the recontre between the property interests of
employers and the privacy interests of workers. In exercising their
rights to employ and retain trustworthy individuals, employers
131. See Falick, supra note 91, at 107-08.
132. See generally 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 60, 209.
133. See United States Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 1956);
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
134. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 371-72, 393; A. WESTIN, supra note
4, at 149; Comment, supra note 7, at 559.
135. See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 240.
136. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 371.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 37. See also 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 4 (a leading
polygrapher maintains, "No one ... has to take the test. They sign a voluntary state-
ment."); A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 150.
139. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 257; A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 149.
140. See A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 149; Polygraph Hearings, supra note 1, at
154 ("you get a job if you submit to the test, and you don't get the job if you don't
submit") (remarks of Mr. Moorhead).
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should have an interest in adopting methods which will, in fact,
achieve those goals. The methods adopted become of particular im-
port because the interests of business go beyond employing honest
personnel. Employers also have interests in employing qualified per-
sonnel. Once employed, business invests billions of dollars annually
in training those individuals and thus, has an interest in retaining
trained employees. In view of all these interests, business is served
best by accurate and reliable techniques which detect dishonest per-
sonnel without denying employment to honest and qualified appli-
cants nor denying continued employment to honest and trained em-
ployees. Otherwise, the return on investment in the techniques is of
questionable value.
An analysis of the techniques adopted raises serious questions as
to their accuracy and reliability and thus their value to business.141
The truth verification process is dependent upon competent examin-
ers, 142 yet polygraph experts acknowledge a majority of their exam-
iners lack requisite training and skill.143 Less than half of the states
have addressed this issue by enacting licensing legislation.144 Despite
licensing efforts, examiner competency standards are not uniformly
rigid.145 Because business relies on the examiner's recommenda-
tions, 1 46 it is difficult to accord much credence to interpretation of
test results without explicit competency standards. Assuming, how-
ever, competent examiners administer the tests, questions about the
reliability and accuracy of the process remain. The emotional and
physical condition of the examinee can distort the truth verification
process. 47 Of particular import to the employment context is the re-
sentment workers may feel towards forced submission to the exami-
nation and to the highly personal questions contained therein.1 48
Both situations evoke emotional states of being which cause physio-
logical responses indistinguishable from those of deception.14 9 Few
141. See supra notes 32-71 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. "In the majority of states, any
one who buys a polygraph machine can go into business." 1977-78 Hearings, supra note
5, at 249. "In 38 states anyone who purchases a polygraph may claim to be a profes-
sional polygrapher." Polygraph Hearings, supra note 1, at 29.
145. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
146. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 238.
147. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 24-27, 36-37 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
state statutes address those concerns. 150 Assuming further, however,
a competent examiner and a test-responsive examinee, the truth ver-
ification has no demonstrable, empirical evidence of its accuracy and
reliability in employment investigations.15 Although consensus exists
of a 70-95% accuracy rate for polygraph examinations in criminal
investigations,1 52 no conclusive statistical data supports the device's
accuracy in employment. 53 It is highly improbable that accuracy
figures for examinations of prospective employees, particularly,
would reflect those of criminal investigations since the former fore-
casts tendencies for future behavior and the latter interprets involve-
ment in past activities.15 4
Not only is the inherent reliability highly questionable but the in-
terpretive techniques adopted by many organizations further dimin-
ish the value of the process. Employers tend to base employment de-
cisions on responses to control questions rather than relevant
questions. 55 The purpose of control questions is to measure the re-
sponses of relevant questions. 56 For example, a typical control ques-
tion is, "Have you ever stolen anything?" Few people can honestly
respond no. Rather than evaluate the examinee's answer to subse-
quent relevant questions, some employers base their decisions on re-
sponses to the control question. Thus, workers responding "no," usu-
ally fail the examination and are not hired because of their failure.
Those responding "yes," are not hired because business prefers not
to employ thieves. Of course, the thefts may involve something as
simple as failure -to pay fifty cents into a coffee fund.
In view of the foregoing, the investment return on the use of truth
verification techniques by business for employment-related decisions
is of questionable value. 5 7 A similar conclusion has been reached in
the field of labor arbitration where polygraph evidence is either ex-
cluded or given little probative value because of its inaccuracy and
unreliability in the employment context.1 58 As a pre-screening tool
150. See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 45, 49 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 32, 42-43 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
155. See Bonner, supra note 7, at 4, col. 4 (Professor Raskin).
156. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
157. Assuming a high figure of 90% accuracy rate, 10% of those tested received
incorrect recommendations and two out of every three of those who fail are innocent.
One commentator provides the following illustration: Assume 50 of 1000 employees com-
mit insider theft. The polygraph will assess 45 of the 50 (90%) as guilty. Further, it will
correctly diagnose 855 of the 950 innocent workers (90%) as innocent. The remaining 95
of the 950 innocent workers (10%) will fail the test. Thus, of the 140 trained employees
who failed (45 plus 95), 66% or two out of every three, will be innocent. Comment, supra
note 7, at 556. See also 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 7; 1977-78 Hearings, supra
note 5, at 32.
158. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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for prospective employees, the devices have no verifiable value to
business.159 Periodic, random testing of employees tends to erode em-
ployer-employee harmony by creating an atmosphere of distrust and
suspicion in the work place.'60 With the dearth of effective verifica-
tion, a serious question is raised whether the inharmonious atmo-
sphere created by those examinations complements management's
desire to work in partnership with labor. Perhaps the only value to
business is from the device's use in those situations occasioned by
incidents of theft. Paralleling specific-issue criminal investigations
and presuming competent examiners and test-responsive examinees,
polygraph use for on-the-job incidents of theft frequently precipitates
confessions of guilt.""' Although business has an interest in employ-
ing and retaining trustworthy workers, serious doubt remains as to
whether the defensive measures adopted, truth verification tech-
niques, achieve those goals.
Society also has an interest in assuring that workers are selected
and retained by the least intrusive methods. While recognizing the
need of business to acquire job-related information, workers view
truth verification techniques as unwarranted intrusions by employ-
ers. "62 Not only are the methods of examination potentially abu-
sive 8 3 but the tampering into highly personal matters is particularly
offensive and viewed as an invasion of privacy.' 6 ' The scope of the
right of privacy, however, is difficult to determine.6 5 Although not
159. See Polygraph Hearings, supra note 1, at 163 (a member of the American
Polygraph Association acknowledged that "such future predictions are highly specula-
tive"); 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 4; 1964 Hearings, supra note 35, at 307;
Hermann, supra note 29, at 85-86; Craver, supra note 3, at 42.
160. See Review of Selected 1963 Legislation, supra note 105, at 734 (polygraph
tests disrupt the work environment); Note, Lie Detectors-Industrial Use of the Poly-
graph, 13 DE PAUL L. REV. 287 (1964).
161. See F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 17, at 113 ("[the lie detector] possesses
another quality of much merit and that is the psychological effect it has in inducing
admissions or confessions from guilty individuals"). See also A. WESrIN, supra note 4, at
212; Note, supra note 51, at 938.
162. See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
163. For example, when workers are exposed to hidden microphones and two-way
mirrors without their knowledge, arguably their seclusion and solitude are impaired. Bur-
key, supra note 32, at 89. See also COGHILL, THE LIE DETECTOR IN EMPLOYMENT 11
(1968). The operation of polygraph machines is also an intrusion by precluding the with-
holding of information by the workers. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. Congressman Moss considered
polygraph examinations as "a major invasion of the privacy of individuals not even sus-
pected of crime, where the price they must pay for seeking employment is the probing on
a broad basis in not only their conscious but their subconscious mind ... " 1964 Hear-
ings, supra note 35, at 373.
165. "[T]here is not a clear line between what should and should not be permitted
specifically guaranteed in the Constitution,"'6 privacy has been de-
fined as "the right of the individual to decide by himself. . . when
and under what conditions his thoughts, speech, and acts, should be
revealed to others. ' 6 7 By analyzing involuntary physiological re-
sponses and penetrating the inner domains of workers, truth verifica-
tion techniques diminish the vitality of the right of privacy.
Before seeking redress against employers, however, workers must
overcome the obstacle of their consent to the examinations."6 Al-
though workers may accede to employer requests, it is doubtful con-
sent would be forthcoming unless their employment status were in
jeopardy.1 69 Considering the disparity in bargaining power, requests
or suggestions may be perceived by workers as disguised demands.170
Thus, a worker's freedom to choose is narrowed considerably when
given the choice between submitting to the test or not being hired or
retained.17 1 Faced with the economic necessity of having or holding a
job, the Worker's consent is neither free nor voluntary but rather co-
erced and nugatory.1 72 Consent is further vitiated by a worker's fear
[for the right of privacy]." Note, supra note 51, at 944 n.91 (citing the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS, § 867, comment at 399 (1939)). See also 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 239
("the attempt to reach into another person's mind and to measure their feelings and their
intentions . . . is the ultimate invasion of privacy").
166. Although lacking a specific guarantee in the Constitution, the right of privacy
has been considered a natural right. "Those [interests] which are secured. . . are called
legal rights; those which ought to be secured are called natural rights." Pound, Interests
of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 346 (1915).
167. Hermann, supra note 29, at 127-28. See also 1974 Comm. Print, supra note
5, at 2 ("[a] person does not relinquish to either his public or private employer his First
Amendment rights or the privacy of his thoughts and beliefs, when he enters into the
employment process"). Even polygraph enthusiasts concede there is an invasion of pri-
vacy but dismiss it as follows: "[O]ne must conclude that while polygraph examination
does invade the privacy of a thief, he has no paramount right to keep his crime private."
Note, supra note 51, at 947 n.107. One could question, however, whether workers have
no paramount right to keep their political affiliations, sexual preferences, and practices
and other related matters private.
168. See supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text. See also 1964 Hearings,
supra note 35, at 44-45:
Proponents of the use of the polygraph fall back on the statement that no one is
forced to take d polygraph test . . . . [T]his is of little or no avail because the
examinee does not realize that not only will his conscious thoughts and his auto-
matic responses to them be recorded but his unconscious thoughts will also be
delved into and consequently he will be giving . . . autonomic responses to
thoughts of which he is totally unaware.
169. See 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 12; 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5,
at 251; Craver, supra note 3, at 37.
170. See Sternbach, supra note 47, at 133; 43 OP. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 25, 27
(1964).
171. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 251; A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 240;
Laymon, supra note 42, at 28.
172. See Hermann, supra note 29, at 77; A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 239 ("It is
also important to understand the meaninglessness of such terms as 'consent' and 'volun-
tary' in the context of polygraphing today. . . ."); 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at
4, 12; Falick, supra note 91, at 109 ("[tlhe employer's seemingly complete control over
the outcome of the employment application or continued employment means that con-
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of appearing dishonest by failure to submit to the examination.
173
These views of worker consent are shared by arbitrators in labor
disputes.17 4
Having overcome the obstacle of consent, workers will continue to
insist their right to privacy is trampled upon by "unreasonable in-
quiries and disclosures [into their] personal and private affairs."1175
Considerable difficulties remain, however, in fashioning a remedy
against those private employers whose actions invade worker privacy.
The absence of state involvement' 7" and the reluctance of the judici-
ary 77 severely circumscribe a worker's opportunity for redress. Ag-
gravated further by limited accessibility to arbitration proceedings
and availability of statutory protections, the majority of workers are
sent, in reality, is almost non-existent").
173. See supra note 22; 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 257, 264; State v.
Community Distributors, 23 N.J. Super. 589, 304 A.2d 213, 218-19 (1973) ("[b]y
merely 'requesting' the employee to take the test, the employer is in fact offering the
employee an ultimatum-either he takes the test or he puts his character in doubt among
management as well as his fellow workers").
174. See e.g., B.F. Goodrich Tire Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 743, 36
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 552, 558 (1961) (Ryder, Arb.) ("[tihe implicit social threat to an
employee ... so compels consent that a guiltless but emotionally fearful employee has
practically no choice but to consent to a testing procedure .... "); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, Local 540 v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1973);
Falick, supra note 91, at 105.
175. Note, supra note 51, at 944.
176. See supra note 91. Although the extensive constitutional arguments, including
invasion of privacy, require state action which is lacking in the private-sector employ-
ment relationship, one commentator has argued persuasively that large corporations
should be considered government entities. Because of their vast economic power, business
satisfies the role of government by serving a public function. Coupled with their being
creatures of state government, corporations can be held to the same constitutional stan-
dards to which states are held. Hermann, supra note 29, at 141-42.
177. See supra note 92. Although recognizing a right of privacy in the penumbras
of the Constitution, federal courts generally are not receptive to extending that right to
personal information collected by others. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(rejected right of privacy to personal information contained in bank records). Recently,
however, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the "sensitivity of any human being
to disclosure of information that may be taken to bear on his or her basic competence."
Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318 (1979). Subsequent lower court deci-
sions have interpreted the above as a "concern for privacy of the individual employee."
Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers' AFL-CIO-CLC v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18
(D.C. Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980);
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. W. Va. 1977) (recog-
nized worker's privacy interests in their medical records); United States v. Perkins, 383
F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1974): "With the uncontrolled development of technological
means whereby anyone can invade the privacy of another . . . . the essential need for
protection of this penumbral right becomes apparent." Id. at 926. "[Olf particular con-
cern is the lie detector. . . . [T]hese devices are not foolproof and they do constitute an
invasion of privacy." Id. at 926 n.1.
denied an effective remedy. Whether the nature of the right of pri-
vacy should encompass protections from truth verification techniques
is best answered by Justice Brandeis who argued, in essence, that the
ingenuity of men in devising technological devices should not succeed
in outflanking the law.178 Thus, individual rights should be viewed
from the perspective of constantly changing conditions to assure that
[t]he replacement of the human eye, ear and nose by more sophisticated
technical devices is increasingly seen ... as a revolutionary step in stripping
individuals of their privacy.1'0
The truth verification process, which goes well beyond replacing the
eyes and ears of management, contains.those technological devices
which "strip individuals of their privacy" and thus, should not "out-
flank the law."180 The worker's loss of human dignity is the same,
whether the invasion of privacy is by government or by private em-
ployer. 1 Although not secured legally, worker privacy ought to be
secure from invasion by employers using truth verification tech-
niques. In the past, Congress has afforded protection to and vindi-
cated the civil liberties of workers by regulating unreasonable activi-
ties which infringe upon their interests.1 82
A RECOMMENDATION
Faced with competing legitimate interests, Congress must weigh
the property interests of employers against the privacy interests of
workers. Any balancing of those interests must consider whether
there are alternative measures of protection.
From the perspective of the employer, business has a right to se-
cure its operations. Employers have become proselytized to
polygraphs, believing security is provided by "a metal box in the
hands of an investigator [which] detect[s] truth or falsehood. 183 In
reality, evidence to support this conclusion is lacking. The reliability
of truth verification techniques to ferret out the dishonest from the
honest workers is yet to be proven. If reductions in theft coincide
with introduction of polygraphs, the fear generated by those devices
may cause the reduction rather than an accurate singling out of sus-
178. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Although the case involved wiretapping, arguably the reasoning is applicable
to truth verification devices.
179. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 253, 264 (1966).
180. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1-2000e-16 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§151-167 (1976 & Supp. v
1981).
183. 1965 REPORT, supra note 80, at 31. See also 1974 Comm. Print, supra note
5, at 4.
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pect or guilty workers.'" Should a verification procedure be devel-
oped, it is unlikely to support a high degree of accuracy since the
features of employment-related use reflect those which experts main-
tain distort the truth verification process. Business has alternative
methods to secure its operations. Tighter internal controls, investiga-
tory procedures, inventory monitoring and supervisorial vigilence can
be adopted. Intense verification of work references and work records,
coupled with proper probationary evaluations, also should reduce the
likelihood of security violations. Although those techniques are less
expedient than truth verification, business relies on them in states
which currently prohibit polygraphs in employment. 18 5
From the workers' perspective, the truth verification process in-
volves a loss of personal freedom and dignity. The degradation of
humanitarian and constitutional values becomes more compelling
when coupled with the incontrovertible deficiencies in the accuracy
and reliability of the process. Workers, however, have few alterna-
tives to protect their privacy interests. By refusing to submit or fail-
ing to consent to the examinations, they risk having or holding a job.
Truth verification is a process based on mental intimidation and
fear which values business expediency as the price of worker pri-
vacy.""6 However, the protection of worker privacy is sufficiently im-
portant to justify the "loss of some ease of personnel administra-
tion."' 87 Rather than totally prohibit the use of polygraph
examinations in employment, as is currently proposed in Congress, 88
I recommend legislation which will: 89
1. Develop a broad definition of truth verification tech-
niques. Otherwise, legislation limited to polygraph exami-
nations will permit the use of less-accurate devices such
as the "wiggle seat." The definition should apply to pre-
184. See 1977-78 Hearings, supra note 5, at 31.
185. See Bonner, supra note 7, at 4, col. 3; Didato, Why Employees Steal, San
Francisco Chron., Aug. 21, 1983, This World, at 9, col. 1; Walker, supra note 5, at 6,
col. 5.
186. See 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5, at 11 ("the right to privacy in our
minds, to speak or keep silent about our thoughts, is one of the oldest and most basic
principles of human individuality and life. Such a valued tradition should not be tam-
pered with for reasons of alleged expediency").
187. Hermann, supra note 29, at 154. See also 1974 Comm. Print, supra note 5,
at 12 ("[t]he price of gaining employment must not be surrendering civil liberties").
188. H. R. REP. No. 2403, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (M. McKinney).
189. See Comment, supra note 7, at 567-68; Markson, A Reexamination of the
Role of Lie Detectors in Labor Relations, 22 LAB. L.J. 394, 406-07 (1971); Note, supra
note 51, at 952-54.
sent and future devices.
2. Apply to any person(s), firms, corporations, associations
and business organizations engaged in interstate com-
merce. Organizations involved with national security,
public safety, and pharmaceuticals may be excluded from
coverage.190
3. Bar the use of truth verification techniques for pre-em-
ployment screening of prospective employees and for peri-
odic, random examination of current employees.
4. Prohibit employers from "requiring or demanding" em-
ployee submission to truth verification techniques in the
investigation of specific incidents of theft. Permit employ-
ers to "request" or "suggest" employee submission pro-
vided there is reason to suspect the employee in question.
Employers must advise these employees of rights with re-
gard to such testing and have the burden of demonstrat-
ing any subsequent consent is noncoerced.
5. Require written employee consent to specific-incident
testing. Prohibit blanket consents.
6. Limit examination subject matter to questions concerning
the specific acts of wrong-doing under investigation.
7. Prohibit disciplinary action based solely on examination
results.
8. Permit employees to require a retest or a recheck of test
interpretations.
9. Require written authorization for disclosure of test re-
sults. Prohibit blanket authorizations.
10. Permit employees access to and the right to copy test
results.
11. Require employers to maintain complete records of test-
ing for three years, including verbatim transcripts.
12. Establish standards governing the conduct of examina-
tions, such as the test environment, minimum compe-
tency-based criteria for examiners.
13. Impose fines and/or imprisonment for violation of the
legislation.
14. Permit employees a private cause of action, including re-
instatement and/or back pay, damages, and upon proper
proof, punitive damages.
190. Any fundamental right is not absolute and thus, a compelling interest may
outweigh the right being regulated. Arguably, the interests of organizations involved with
national security and pharmaceuticals may outweigh the privacy interests of workers to
the extent of knowing about criminal and drug-related activity and/or aspirations. But
see Hermann, supra note 29, at 152-53.
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CONCLUSION
While no doubt business has suffered from costly insider crime,
their solutions go well beyond detecting the honest from the dishon-
est employee. Employers have developed a seemingly insatiable ap-
petite to learn all things about all people. Rather than providing
workers with a choice in responding, business now expects answers 91
and has adopted truth verification methods to insure those answers
are forthcoming. As business grows more infatuated with the use of
truth verification techniques, workers may find George Orwell par-
ticularly prophetic as they are plugged into all forms of Orwellian
technology. Without Congressional modification of the practices, a
worker's right of privacy will become meaningless. Uncontrolled
truth verification techniques are
an insidious search of the human mind and are a breach of the most funda-
mental of human rights. They provide a vehicle of excursion into the most
private recesses of the human mind. Even if the polygraph testing was trust-
worthy, there is still no possible justification for such "mental
wiretapping." 1
9 2
191. See Comment, note 7, at 551, citing 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2251 (2d
ed. 1923) ("[ilf there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a right to the
expected answer,--that is, confession of guilt").
192. 1965 REPORT, supra note 80, at 43 (statement of Congressman Cornelius
Gallagher).

